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For gender-related information, previous studies have shown that children of 
preschool age are more likely to remember schema-consistent information 
over schema-inconsistent information. In this study, an attempt was made to 
boost children's recognition for inconsistent information. In order to do this, 
children were presented with pictures of both gender-consistent and 
inconsistent content. Group one was presented with the pictures and an 
accompanying label. For group two, children were given a label and asked to 
describe only the pictures where an actor was performing counter-schematic 
behavior. The postulated mechanism responsible for the expected change in 
memory for group two involved an augmentation of the schematic structure. 
The children's description would encourage schematic growth, and the 
memory benefits that are derived from schematic organization would have 
been the result. Group three was added to test for the memory changes that 
may occur when describing consistent information as well. These children 
were asked to describe both consistent and inconsistent information. Overall 
results indicated that for children not describing the stimuli, previous research 
went unsupported and children did not have a better memory for either type of 
information. Children in group two also did not have a memory preference for 
either type of information. Children in the third group which described both 
inconsistent and consistent information, though, did have a memory 
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Introduction: The Schema 
Schemas organize information in order to help us make sense of our 
environment. They are the interpretations and expectations which guide 
perception, memory and decision making (Hastie, 1981). Schemas can take a 
variety of forms, and can be used to describe rules, concepts, the self, 
individuals, events, and social roles (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hastie, 1981; 
Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Despite this diversity, these schemas do have a 
common characteristic: Specificity. 
When processing information, humans do not make identical copies of 
the environment. There is simply too much information to absorb. Instead, we 
attend to elements that are relevant to what we are doing, and store those 
pieces for later use (Hastie, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Normally, 
information that is consistent with the expectations of the activated schema is 
that which is noticed (Hastie, 1981). For example, a person is looking for their 
eye glasses. It is not until after about five minutes of searching that they 
realize that they are wearing them. Although absent-minded, this makes 
sense because the glasses were in a location that they normally do not look 
for them. Their whereabouts weren't in the looking-for-my-glasses schema. As 
a result of the activated schema, obvious environmental characteristics were 
overlooked. This type of guided, environmental search is key to the efficient 
and purposeful function of information processing within the schema. 
The schema is also responsible for the ease of storage for congruent 
information (Hastie, 1981). This occurs through a contextualization process. 
When something fits into the predefined terms of the schematic model, the 
schema has an easier time recognizing and interpreting that information. This 2 
is referred to as "chunking" and can involve large amounts of information 
(Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Inconsistent information, on the other hand, is 
defined as not being anticipated by the schema. Because it may not register 
in the mind, it has a more difficult time becoming a memory. Even when the 
information is noticed, storage without the supporting schematic framework is 
problematic. Inconsistent information suffers both a lack of attention and 
active thought as a result (Liben & Signorella, 1993). 
When it does receive sufficient attention, though, inconsistent information 
can be better remembered. This is thought to be due to the cognitive 
processes that ensue. When something is identified to be inconsistent with 
one's beliefs, a reconciliation is required. What occurs is an active, 
justification process which solidifies the inconsistency as a new memory 
within the thinker (Hastie, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). 
During this thinking process, a new cognitive network is being 
constructed. The thinker, by taking an active, interpretive approach, causes a 
representation of the counter-stereotypic information to form, i.e. a new 
schema. This new structure then becomes useful during memory recall 
through its accessible schematic nature. In this way, one's memory becomes 
altered and can now attend to previously overlooked information. 
Inconsistent information can either be something that is in opposition to 
an entrenched schema, or a new element to add to a pre-existing 
understanding. When new information in considered contrary to the gist of a 
currently held schema, though, it may be incorporated in a slightly different 
way. There is some support for the existence of counter-schematic elements 
as subcategories within the greater schema itself (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
However, they are characterized as describing isolated case scenarios and 
do not act as disconfirming evidence for the schema itself. 
The following study will attempt to induce this schema enhancing thought 
process in the child. Research investigating children's memory performance 3 
and the memory boosting effects of a process known as labeling will be 
reviewed. There will also be a focus on gender-related memory studies. 
Gender Schemas 
Children's gender schemas, a means of understanding the world in terms 
of gender (Bern, 1981), are also susceptible to the filtering effects of the 
schema. Research bears out three very interesting properties of these gender 
schemas in relation to memory. First, children have a better memory for 
information that is consistent with their gender schema, as opposed to 
inconsistent information (Liben & Signorella, 1993; Martin & Halverson, 1983; 
Ruble & Stangor, 1986). This effect is exaggerated in children who are more 
gender schematized than others (Bern, 1981; Hort, Leinbach, & Fagot, 1991: 
Signorella & Liben; 1984), especially in younger children (Levy, 1989). 
Second, children are more likely to transform gender inconsistent information 
into gender consistent information during memory recall ( Levy, 1989; Martin 
& Halverson, 1983; Ruble & Stangor, 1986). Thirdly, children have better 
memory for gender consistent information when it corresponds with their own 
sex (Levy & Boston, 1994; Koblinsky, Cruse, & Sugawara, 1978, Ruble & 
Stangor, 1986). 
The reasoning for these three occurrences follows respectively. First, a 
better memory for schema-consistent information stems from the 
organizational properties of the schema itself. Consistent information, by 
definition, is that which is included in the schematic structure. Because the 
framework is set up to expect consistent information, anything perceptually 
synonymous in the environment will be more easily recognized and 
interpreted. Alternately, as it has no preorganization, inconsistent information 
is either not attended to, is not encoded as efficiently, or is not stored as 4 
effectively, and thus suffers a deficit during memory recall (Liben & Signorella, 
1993; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). 
The gender transformation error occurs when recalled information is 
different from the stimuli that was actually presented. This would be the case 
when a child remembers a male firefighter coming to his or her class, when 
that person had actually been a female. This inaccuracy is attributed to either 
of two processes. The first involves an initial perceptual deficit and the 
subsequent insertion of faulty information into an incomplete memory. These 
memory distortions are the result of the schema's lack of efficacy when 
recording information. It ends up that gender is not registered during the 
encoding process. When the time comes for recall, gender must be inferred, 
and the practical substitute inserted into the memory turns out to be different 
from the original which actually occurred. These errors are more likely to 
occur in the direction which favors a gender schema-consistent role (Levy, 
1989). 
A second reasoning implicates the child's desire for order and sense in 
the world. A motivational factor exists which propels the child towards 
impressions that are consistent with social norms (Ruble & Stangor, 1986). 
During recall, an intact memory may be changed in order to match the child's 
perception of how the world is supposed to be. 
For the third memory effect, a better memory for gender consistent 
information when it corresponds to the sex of the subject, one must 
understand the self-schema. A self-schema is a definition of one's own 
person. This self-definition is organized in terms of concepts people find to be 
true about themselves. These may differ in nature developmentally, such as 
the younger child seeing him/herself in more concrete terms (Ruble & 
Stangor, 1986). They all include, however, the element of self-definition. In 
the social setting, these self-schemas may help us interpret others' behavior. 
Characteristics that one discovers in themselves, are those which they look 
for in others (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Therefore, memory effect number three 5 
occurs: Children's use of gender-constrained traits in their own self-schemas 
allow them to detect similar features in others of the same sex. 
Many of these effects have been found with children who span the age 
range from kindergarten to 4th grade. The preschooler's memory also 
appears to behave similarly. Levy (1989) and Boston and Levy (1991) found 
that younger children have a better memory for gender consistent information, 
as well as make more gender transformation errors. In the same study, 
Boston and Levy (1991) also found that preschoolers were better able to 
recall stimuli corresponding to their own biological sex. 
The gender schema is utilized in this study because of its well 
researched background. It's use, though, does question the consequences of 
changing gender schemas in children. Are gender schemas necessary for 
interpreting the environment? There is evidence that gender-schemas are 
developmental in nature. They emerge as early as two-years of age (Kuhn, 
Nash, & Brucken, 1978) and change systematically across early childhood 
into adolescence (Ruble & Stangor, 1986; Serbin, Powlishta, & Gulko, 1993). 
Adults expect gender-typed behavior of both boys and girls (Johnson & 
Workman, 1993). Peer acceptance may also be affected by sex-typed 
behaviors. Children ages four to ten had a lower liking for boys with female-
stereotyped characteristics and girls with male-stereotyped attributes (Martin, 
1989). Further, children have been shown to prefer other children with 
gender-stereotyped attributes similar to their own (Zucker, Wilson-Smith, 
Kurita, & Stem, 1995). These effects may be more intense for males' social 
development, though. One study found that only boys' use of male-
stereotyped behaviors are related to their own perceived physical 
competence and peer acceptance (Cramer & Skidd, 1992). Also, males with 
feminine characteristics are perceived differently than females with male 
characteristics (Martin, 1995). 
There is a competing body of research that displays positive outcomes 
for children with both same and opposite sex-typed gender schemas. These 6 
personality types are referred to as androgenous. Androgenous children 
display a higher self-esteem, are better liked, and are better adjusted than 
their traditionally sex-typed peers (Allgood-Merten & Stockard, 1991; Boldizar, 
1991; Massad, 1981). Androgenous people are also better able to adapt to 
new situations by adjusting their behavior to situational demands (Shaffer, 
Pegalis, & Cornell, 1992). What these combined findings convey is that there 
are no definitive positive or negative consequences when dismantling gender 
schemas. What is apparent is that research which does tamper with these 
sensitive issues should move forward at a cautious pace. 
Effects of Labeling 
The question now turns towards methods of increasing children's 
memory for gender-inconsistent information. Research investigating the 
process of labeling in children lends some promise to this attempt. In the 
process of labeling, a name or description is supplied in association with a 
stimulus. For example, the subject is presented with a picture of a man 
chopping wood. The experimenter would provide the label "a man chopping 
some wood" with the drawing. Purportedly, this boosts memory by alerting a 
schema into activation, or by offering a ready-made interpretation when none 
exists for the child. Interestingly, recall for inconsistent information becomes 
boosted by this attempt. Recall for consistent information, however, also 
improves (Levy, 1989; Liben & Signorella, 1993). The end result is a 
maintenance of the same relative proportion of memories, with consistent 
information being better remembered than gender inconsistent information. 7 
Verbalization and the Effects on Memory 
Of interest, children in the studies mentioned above were supplied with 
stimulus labels generated by the researchers. Perhaps, though, if subjects 
were allowed to create their own labeling or description for inconsistent 
information, a more pronounced outcome might occur. Remember, 
improvements in memory for counter-stereotypical information may be the 
result of thought (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). This process would be different from 
labeling, as schematic structures would be created, and not just cued. This 
would allow for further improvements in memory recognition for otherwise 
difficult to recall information. 
Studies which investigate the effects of children's verbalizations lend 
evidence towards this approach. It appears that children who are encouraged 
to verbalize by adults have a better memory for content information (Price, 
1984; Price, Hess, & Dickson, 1981). The idea follows that verbalizations 
allow for memory structures to develop in long term memory stores. By 
changing one's knowledge base in this manner, incoming information can be 
dealt with in a new way. This means that once unfamiliar items may be more 
easily comprehended, and their recall may also be facilitated (Price, Hess, & 
Dickson, 1981). The means by which parents invited their children's 
verbalizations in these studies were through questions, requests, and 
demands. A similar enhancement of memory may be possible if subjects in 
this study are allowed to create their own description for inconsistent 
information. 
For this thesis, preschool-age children will be asked to generate their 
own descriptions for gender inconsistent behavior. It is hypothesized that this 
will induce a better memory for inconsistent information. The mechanism 
responsible for this heightened recall will be the newly created schema itself 
and it's simple schematic characteristic of enhanced recall. 8 
Method 
Subjects 
The children used in this study were enrolled at the Oregon State 
University Child Development Center. There were 82 children attending the 
program, 32 of which whose families income falls below the poverty line set 
by the state of Oregon. The children's ages ranged from 3 years 3 months, to 
5 years 7 months, with 46 boys and 36 girls attending. In the study itself, 54 
children were successfully tested, with 27 boys and 27 girls. All loss of 
subjects was attributed to a lack of parental permission (13.9%), a lack of the 
child's permission (11.3%), and the experimenter's decision that a child was 
unable to complete the study in it's current delivery (3.8%). Another 
descriptor, language spoken in the home, was also collected. For this sample, 
9.3% of the families spoke Spanish, 3.7% spoke Hamaric, 3.7% spoke 
Chinese, and 1.8% spoke Hindi. 
The Hollingshead Four Factor Index was used in order to determine the 
socioeconomic status of the sample. According to this measure, families can 
achieve scores ranging from 0 - 66. In this study, six categories were 
arbitrarily created from this scale at 11 point intervals. Also, two additional 
groups were introduced, as their scores couldn't be created according to the 
Hollinghead's criteria. These groups are: families whose parents are students, 
and families whose parents are unemployed (see table 1). 9 
<66  <55  <44  <33  <22  <11  unem  student 
23 5 4 2 7 0 4  7 
Table 1.  Socioeconomic status of sample 
Materials 
Children were divided into three groups and involved in three separate 
sessions. In the first session, all children were assessed for their gender 
schemasticity (see Appendix C for stimuli). This is the degree to which some 
children will rely upon their gender stereotypes during perception. Children 
with higher scores are more likely to process information in terms of gender 
(Bern, 1981; Hort, Leinbach, & Fagot, 1991: Signorella & Liben; 1984). Each 
child was presented with 20 gender-typed objects from the SERLI (Edelbrock 
& Sugawara, 1978). They were asked, "Who would use a  ,  boys? girls? 
or both boys and girls? The child then placed the picture in the appropriate 
box in front of them. The pictures were randomized before presentation for 
each child. 
At least one day later, session two involved the presentation of gender-
typed activity pictures with either male or female models. Example behaviors 
include an actor sewing, doing dishes, and using tools. All three groups were 
presented with pictures of men and boys doing typical male activities, and 
typical female activities. They were also shown pictures of women and girls 
doing typical female activities, and typical male activities (see Appendix A). 
For all groups, every picture presentation was associated with an 
experimenter-generated label. For group one, children were presented with 10 
the pictures and their label. For group two, all pictures were presented with a 
label, yet only inconsistent drawings were associated with the question, 
"What can you tell me about this picture?" For group three, all pictures were 
presented with a label, with both consistent and inconsistent drawings being 
associated with the same question, "What can you tell me about this 
picture?" 
The stimuli for session two were black and white line drawings taken from 
the SERLI (Edelbrock & Sugawara, 1978). There were eight pictures with 
counter-stereotypic content, four displaying a male model and four with a 
female model. There were also eight pictures with stereotypic content, four 
displaying a male model and four with a female model. Each picture was 
presented for five seconds with an immediately offered label. If a description 
was needed, it was asked for prior to the presentation and this 5 second 
period. The picture was then removed from sight. Children in the description 
groups were allowed up to 30 seconds to deliver a response. Four pictures 
that were free from gender content were shown before the experimental 
presentations, and four pictures after. This helped ensure that later memory 
recall for the testing items was not the result of primacy or recency (Greene, 
1992; Wyer & Srull, 1989). 
During the third session, children were given a memory recognition test. 
This occurred after a one day interim. At this point, children were presented 
with the 16 pictures that had been shown to them at time 2, as well as sixteen 
that were not. These were presented on four posters featuring eight images 
each (16 target + 16 distracters / 4). Each poster contained two consistent 
and two inconsistent behaviors seen in the previous test situation, as well as 
four never before seen pictures. The distracter items were also taken from the 
SERLI, and are identical to the 16 original stimuli in the activity portrayed, 
except that they will contain an actor of the opposite gender (see Appendix 
B). The children were asked to point to those pictures which they have seen 11 
before. All correct responses (hits) and incorrect responses (false alarms) 
were recorded. 
Pilot Testing 
A pilot test was initially run with eight subjects ranging in age from 3 
years 3 months to 5 years 5 months, with 5 girls and 3 boys. There was a 
question as to whether or not the stimuli should be presented for three or five 
seconds. Also of concern was whether or not the time lag between time 2 and 
time 3 should be one day or seven days. Results from these children guided 
this research project towards using a 5 second presentation period, with a 
one day wait before the recognition phase. 
Statistical Analysis 
Socioeconomic status for the subjects was measured by the 
Hollingshead, and then controlled for through matching. Following the 
matching process, children were randomly assigned to one of the three 
groups. 
A General Linear Model with repeated measures was used to test all 
hypotheses. The first GLM examined the differences between group one and 
group three. It was set up in a 2X2 design, with gender-consistency/ 
inconsistency of the information as the repeated measure. The between 
groups variable considered whether or not the child described the information. 
A GLM design was chosen for this analysis because of it's ability to 
statistically control for additional covariates. For this study, those variables 
were gender schemasticity, gender, and age (see tables 2, 3, & 4 for the 
descriptive statistics on these variables). There was no difference between 
groups on the basis of their covariate values (see table 5). In addition, none 12 
of the covariates were significant in the initial results except for age in the 
group one X two comparison (see table 6). Therefore, age was the only 
covariate included in all subsequent analyses. 
The second GLM examined the differences between group one and 
group two. The repeated measure was the gender consistency of the stimuli. 
The between subjects variable was again group membership. Age was 
entered as a covariate. 
males  females  total n 
Group 1  7  14  21 
Group 2  10  7  17 
Group 3  10  6  16 
Table 2.  Gender distribution of the sample 
n  min.  max.  mean  std. dev. 
Group 1  21  0  20  8.7  4.29 
Group 2  17  0  20  9.4  5.67 
Group 3  16  0  13  6.5  3.29 
Table 3.  Gender schemasticity scores of the sample 
n  min.  max.  mean  std. dev. 
Group 1  21  3.42  5.25  4.21  .61 
Group 2  17  3.25  5.58  4.44  .78 
Group 3  16  3.42  5.25  4.32  .59 
Table 4.  Age range and means of sample 13 
Sum of  Mean 
Squares  df  Square  F  Sig. 
Age  Between  .46  2  .23  .53  .59 
Groups 
Within  22.29  51  .44 
Groups 
Total  22.76  53 
Gender Between  .97  2  .48  1.96  .15 
Groups 
Within  12.53  51  .24 
Groups 
Total  13.5  53 
Schem Between  74.78  2  37.39  1.82  .17 
Groups 
Within  1044.94  51  20.49 
Groups 
Total  1119.72  53 
Table 5.  ANOVA testing for differences between groups for covariates 
Type III 
Sum of  Mean 
Source  Squares  df  Square  F  Sig. 
Intercept  6.36  1  6.38  2.51  .12 
AGE  9.94  1  9.94  3.91  .05 
GENDER  .58  1  .58  .23  .64 
SCHEM  5.43  1  5.43  2.14  .15 
GROUP  1.22  1  1.22  .48  .49 
Error  83.8  33  2.54 
Table 6.  Test for significance of covariates, group one X two analysis 14 
Hypotheses 
Group one X three analysis 
1. Group three will remember more overall information than group one 
2. Both groups will remember more gender-consistent information than 
gender-inconsistent information  
Group one X two analysis  
3. An interaction effect: children in group one will remember more 
gender-consistent information than inconsistent, while group two will 
remember equivalent amounts of both types of information. 
The reason why three groups were needed in this study involves both 
statistical soundness and actual research goals. To make this easier to 
understand, all three groups have been defined again below. 
G1: doesn't describe any information (group 1)  
G2: describe inconsistent information only (group 2)  
G3: describes all information (group 3)  
The initial research goals involved only boosting children's recall for 
inconsistent information. Research shows that children's recall for stereotype 
consistent information is better than that for stereotype inconsistent 
information. The goal of this project was to increase the relative recall of 
inconsistent information when compared to consistent information. The net 
result would be something similar to: The number of inconsistent items 
recalled would be the same or greater than the number of consistent items 
recalled. This hypothesis is testable by comparing G1 to G2. You could not 
infer this by comparing G1 to G3. So why create this third group? 15 
The reason involved the design of past research in this area, especially a 
study by Levy, after which this project is closely modeled. Levy was looking at 
whether or not labeling improved children's level of recall. He theorized that 
labeling jump-started the schema into activation and made the memorization 
of information easier. He had two groups, label/no label X 
consistent/inconsistent information, a 2 X 2 design. It was believed that by 
following the model of a previous study, this project would be stronger. This is 
especially true since this study already closely follows the set-up of Levy's. 
Also, by allowing the results of the G1 X G3 analysis into the project, we 
would be learning an additional piece of information: Does describing alone 
boost memory for both types of information? 
The third group was added so that this study would appeal to two groups 
of thought. One camp would be interested in the degenderization of children's 
memory and stereotypic development. These people would be interested in 
comparing G1 and G2. Can an intervention involving counter-stereotypic 
information lessen the dominance in memory that stereotype-consistent 
information holds? The other crowd would be those interested in the model 
the project is using. They wouldn't be surprised by any memory effects 
resulting from description. They would think that the process of verbalization 
itself boosts memory, and that this is where the importance of the project lies. 
They are interested in comparing G1 and G3. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study was initially a measure of children's 
recognition memory appearing in Levy (1989). However, there were problems 
with this measure. Scores from this measure were described as ranging from 
+.5 to -.5, with positive values denoting a higher hit rate relative to the false 
alarm rate. When run with this study's data, scores were capable of ranging 16 
from +.5 to -1. It was necessary to find a replacement measure which still 
incorporated hit and false alarm rates, but behaved in a more consistent 
manner. 
After investigating signal detection theory, a reasonable measure was 
located. Here is a short background on that measure, Ag: 
Ag = probability (hit) + (1 - probability (false alarm)) 
2 
An ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve defines the relationship 
between false alarm and hit rates for a set of data. The ROC curve is 
assumed to have one end point where the FA rate is zero, and another where 
the hit rate is one. It is also assumed to be a monotonically increasing 
function with a non-increasing slope (Craig, 1979). 
Ag is a measurement of the area beneath this ROC curve, and it supplies 
a description of memory accuracy. Higher values of Ag indicate an ROC curve 
with a steeper slope. This translates into higher hit rates in proportion to false 
alarms. So, subjects with higher Ag scores are more accurate in their memory 
for previously viewed information. Lower scores are related to ROC curves 
with a less steep slope, and thus, poorer memory. This measure was also 
useful because it is considered to be nonparametric. A later discussion will 
illustrate clear concerns about the normality of the data collected in this study 
(also see figures 9 & 10). 
A different measure, however, was actually used to analyze the data: 
MA (memory accuracy) = # of hits - # of false alarms 
There were two reasons for this decision. One, MA correlated perfectly with 
the value Ag. Two, it offers a simplified understanding of children's memory 17 
scores. Positive scores are associated with better memories for target 
information. And, the greater the score, the more accurate the memory. 
In order to test the hypotheses of this thesis, two scores were actually 
collected for each child. MAc was a measure of children's recognition memory 
for consistent information. MAi was a measure of children's recognition 
memory for gender-inconsistent pictures. Listed by group, data distributions 
for the measures MAc and MAi are represented by histograms in figures one 
and two. 18 
Group One  Group Two 
0.0  1.0  2.0  3.0  4.0  5.0 -1.0  0.0  1.0  2.0 
MAc  MAc 
-1.0  0.0  1.0  2.0  3.0  -2.5  0.0  2.5  5.0 
MAi  MAi 
Figure 1. Distribution of sample data for groups one and two 19 
Group Three 
-2.0  0.0  2.0  4.0  tO  to 
MAC 
MAi 
Figure 2. Distribution of sample data for group three 20 
Results 
Group 1 and Group 3 
group one (n=21) / std. dev.  group three (n=16) / std. dev 
MA for consistent 
information (MAc) 
.14  .65  .93  1.98 
MA for inconsistent 
information (MAi) 
.14  .91  .43  1.82 
Table 7. Children's mean recognition memory scores 
A general linear model allowing for repeated measures was used to 
examine differences in memory accuracy according to whether or not children 
described the information presented to them. Age was included as a covariate 
in the analysis, and was found to be insignificantly related to memory 
accuracy (F < 2.074, ns). The main effect for the consistency of information 
was marginally significant, F(1,32) = 3.812, p < .059, but for group affiliation 
was insignificant (F < 1.253, ns). There was a significant group X consistency 
interaction. F(1,32) = 4.407, p < .043. 
These results indicate that children's memory for gender consistent and 
inconsistent information is variable. Children's memory accuracy for 
consistent information is greater only when they are asked to describe both 
types of information. 21 
Group 1 and Group 2 
group one (n=21) / std. dev.  group two (n=16) / std. dev 
MA for consistent 
information (Mac) 
.14  .65  .64  1.41 
MA for inconsistent 
information (MAi) 
.14  .91  .58  1.93 
Table 8. Children's mean recognition memory scores 
A general linear model-repeated measures was also used to examine the 
differences between group one and group two. There was no significant main 
effect for gender-consistency of the information (F < .884, ns), or for group (F 
<.890, ns). There was a main effect, however, for the covariate age F(1,35) = 
4.086, p < .051. 
If the original hypotheses had been supported, a significant interaction 
effect would have been present as well. The effect would have demonstrated 
that memory for consistent information was better than that for inconsistent 
information, but only for group one. For group two this effect would not have 
been the case. There was no significant interaction effect (F < .109, ns). 
A regression analysis was performed on the data to estimate the effect of 
age on the overall memory performance of the children. 22 
b  Std. Error 
GROUP  .70  .74  .94  .35 
.05 AGE  1.10  .54  2.02 
Table 9. Group and age regressed against overall memory scores 
There are a couple of numerical interpretations for this b value. The basic 
analysis reveals that for every one unit increase in age there is a 
commensurate 1.103 unit rise in overall MA scores. This increase can be the 
result of either of two processes. With increases in age, children either 
increase their number of hits, or decrease their number of false alarms. It is 
possible that these two processes are qualitatively different. Unfortunately, 
this analysis is unable to detect which of the two, or if both processes, are 
occurring. 23 
Discussion 
Group 1 and Group 3 
The pattern of interaction found between groups one and three was 
unexpected. The original hypothesis predicted similar outcomes for both 
groups, with gender-consistent information being better remembered than 
inconsistent information. The fact that the anticipated outcome was present 
for only group three requires some explanation. 
Starting with group one, children remembered equivalent amounts of 
consistent and inconsistent information. This contradicts previous findings 
(Levy, 1989; Liben & Signorella, 1993), where labels were also offered during 
the stimulus presentation. Were the children in this study thinking differently? 
Possibly. Remembering back, a better memory for gender-consistent 
information was predicted here because children were thought to have 
schemas for that information. Because children remembered both types of 
information equally as well, it is reasonable to think that children may have 
separate schemas available to process either consistent or inconsistent 
information. Earlier cited, Fiske & Taylor (1991) mention that counter-
schematic structures may even exist within other schemas. These internal 
schemas do not act as disconfirming evidence for the larger schemas, though. 
They exist to explain counter-specific examples as isolated case scenarios. 
In order to have obtained these dual schemas, the children in this study 
may have been exposed to a cultural shift in the curriculum of gender. 
Exposure to new interpretations of gender from parents, teachers, and 
perhaps even peers, may be altering the schematic content of these children's 
minds. Alerting children to the presence of women performing typical male 24 
duties and vice versa, for example, may be providing children with a new 
means of perceiving the world. 
If this can be assumed to be true, then why did the children in group three 
revert back to the predicted memory pattern? These children differed from 
those in group one only in the fact that they were asked during each picture, 
"What can you tell me about this picture'?" This request for description 
appears to be associated with a qualitative change in the way children think. 
Schemas can vary in the amount of information that they contain, and 
they become more complex as they develop (Davies, 1994; Fiske & Taylor, 
1991). It is this complexity that may have accounted for the children's change 
in thinking. The assumption was made above that children may now have 
schemas for both gender-consistent and inconsistent information. These two 
schemas may vary, though, in their content. Schemas with gender-consistent 
content may be richer and contain more examples than those for inconsistent 
information. In fact, the inconsistent schemas may only be sub-schemas 
within the consistent schemas themselves (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
When children are asked to remember gender-based stimuli, they can 
activate the appropriate schema based upon the consistency or inconsistency 
of the information. This was evidenced by group one's performance, with 
children remembering both types of information equally as well. When 
children are asked to describe the information, however, a different process 
takes place. A deeper type of processing is possibly occurring, and the 
schema is searched more thoroughly during the encoding stage. The stimuli 
which are supported by the more diverse schemas have more connections 
through which a memory can be later evoked. This results in the increased 
likelihood of consistent recall as seen in group three. 
Under these terms, the gender-consistent schema is more insidious than 
originally thought. At first glance, there appears to be a division of power 
between consistent and inconsistent schemas. When information is more 
ardently processed, however, the focus of the perceptual system can change. 25 
The ability of children to have two separate beliefs about the same topic 
is somewhat upheld by a study looking at children's play preferences. Lynn, 
Eisenbud, and Rose (1995) exposed children to neutral, non-sex-typed toys. 
Experimenters then applied a gender label to the toys. Children declared the 
toys to be appropriate for themselves and/or others who had the same gender 
as the label. Later in the experiment, more attractive toys were presented with 
opposite-sexed gender labels. Although children rated these toys less 
desirable, they did like them as much as the less attractive same-sex labeled 
toys. In this case, children have both a gender-appropriate schema and a 
"toys-I-like-to-play-with" schema. 
Children's reaction to the attractive toy without a gender label is intended 
to denote desire for that toy, hence its attractiveness. With the added element 
of gender-appropriateness, though, a competing schema arises. According to 
some rule, children are making choices about which schema to follow. 
Although more emotionally charged, this process is similar to the one 
explained above. This is a case where two schemas are activated, but one 
bears more salience to the situation. Even though these children are 
recognizing the gender appropriateness of the toy, they still choose to play 
with it. The decisions for the children in Lynn, et. al. (1997) and those in this 
thesis rests in the degree to which competing schemas are activated, and the 
prevailing utility of the more descriptive schema. 
Group 1 and Group 2 
For the analysis between groups one and two, an interaction effect was 
anticipated. Memory for consistent information was predicted to be greater 
than that for inconsistent information in group one, but not for group two. This 
outcome was argued to be the result of the treatment for group two. When 
presented with gender inconsistent pictures, these children were asked, 26 
"What can you tell me about this picture." Without also having this request 
during the presentation of the consistent information, it was believed that 
there would no longer be a memory preference for the gender-consistent 
pictures. It turns out that there was no significant interaction effect. 
This outcome can also be understood in terms of the interpretations given 
above. Information that is investigated more deeply, only has an increased 
chance of recall if the activated schema itself has an increased depth and 
complexity. For group two, the gender-inconsistent pictures were investigated 
more intensely. Their resulting schemas, though, were less detailed. The 
memory benefits we previously saw for consistent information were not 
possible for the inconsistent information presented to group two. Therefore, 
children's memory for both gender-consistent and inconsistent information 
was similar. 
These results seem to support the psychological nature and fluidity of the 
gender role, as children in this study were not subject to the memory biases in 
previous studies (Liben & Signorella, 1993; Martin & Halverson, 1983; Ruble 
& Stangor, 1986) Behavior, by these terms, is not constrained by gender, but 
rather defines it. To take a symbolic interactionist perspective (LaRossa & 
Reitzes, 1993), gender roles are now being renegotiated in our culture. 
Perhaps during this conversion process, we are required to maintain a dual 
interpretation of the world. On one hand, it is okay for women to perform 
stereotypically male duties. On the other hand, it is more likely for the person 
to associate men with that same activity. At first glance, this may seem 
problematic. The positive side is realized when children are capable of 
remembering both types of information, both gender-consistent and 
inconsistent. Their perceptual sensitivity is increased and their impression of 
their environment is in turn, more accurate. 27 
Limitations 
A frequency analysis of the raw data in this study alludes to a problem. 
Over half of the children tested (n = 36) responded with eight hits as well as 
eight false alarms. In terms of their recognition memory score, this is equal to 
zero. Because so many subjects responded in this manner, the distribution of 
scores is not normal. The statistical outcomes of the GLM's in this study 
should therefore be suspect. To try and make sense of this memory effect, 
though, a variety of explanations have been generated. There is a question, 
also, as to whether or not MA is actually a memory score under these 
conditions. Perhaps the dependent variable was actually a measure of 
children's desire to please the researcher. On the other hand, MA may be a 
memory score if children were focusing on the activity of the actor. Assuming 
this to be true, children were scoring perfectly. It is the perspective of the 
researcher that for most children, though, Memory Accuracy was not a 
measure of children's memory for the gender of the actor in the drawings. 
When a subject is in a situation where a correct response is asked of 
them, their perception is important. Their perceived risk of committing an 
error, as well as the anticipated benefit of providing a correct answer come 
into play. According to signal detection theory, a conservative response 
strategy limits the number of false alarms. It also decreases the overall 
number of hits. Alternately, a more liberal strategy increases both the number 
of hits and false alarms (Shapiro, 1994). 
For this study, children may have utilized the more liberal approach. 
Depending upon the child, they might have seen the detriment of answering 
incorrectly to be quite small. Another scenario depicts the child committing 
errors because of their ambitious attempts to answer everything correctly. 
There might also have been the child who utilized both strategies 28 
simultaneously. Either of these strategies or the both combined could have 
led to the memory errors seen here. 
An alternative explanation is a bit simpler. During the recognition phase 
of the project, children were asked to point to any pictures that they had seen 
before. After each picture was selected, the experimenter placed a star in the 
bottom right corner of that picture as a memory marker. This process was 
selected for its interest value to the child and its possible ability to defend 
against inhibition. As mentioned by an observer, this could have had an 
unintended effect. The children who achieved memory scores of zero could 
have merely enjoyed having a star applied to every picture. Even though this 
possible outcome was anticipated in the beginning, it was thought that the 
researcher's application of the stars, and not the child's, would have removed 
this effect. 
A child's perception of difference also may have played a role in this 
study. The pictures presented at time 1 and the foils introduced at time 2 
differed only in the sex of the actor. In order for children to choose one picture 
over another, they would have to be able to distinguish between the two. 
Following the recognition task, children scoring an MA of zero were 
questioned as to whether or not they could tell the difference between the 
pictures. 
First, children were alerted to the fact that two similar pictures were 
present in the array. They were than asked if the two pictures were the same 
or different. Interestingly, most of the children noted that the pictures were 
different. When asked why they were different, the children mentioned that in 
one picture there was a man and in the other, a woman. Some children did, 
however, believe that the pictures were the same (n = 11). For most of these 
children, their focus was on the activity of the actor in the picture. For 
example, when children were asked why the pictures were the same, they 
would mention that both people were feeding the baby, or that both were 
chopping wood, etc. 29 
The potential lies here for the further investigation of children's memory 
ties to people's behavior and not their gender. This is especially interesting 
when you consider that there were no significant findings in terms of the 
gender-consistency of the information in this study for group one. As stated 
before, perhaps we are looking at a shift in children's developmental course 
due a degenderizing curriculum in our culture. Alternately, the explanation 
may be less extreme than a change in our cultural perspective. Some children 
may simply process the world in a qualitatively different manner, with a focus 
upon the action and not the actor. 
There still lies the task of describing the poor performance of children 
who were able to tell the difference between the pictures. A likely reason for 
these children's unusual memory scores deals with their developmental 
understanding of memory. Children with less accurate memories would need 
to understand some aspects of thought in order to successfully complete the 
memory task in this study. To substitute for their inaccurate recognition, they 
would need to problem solve for an answer. If they were unsure about which 
pictures they had seen, they would need to come up with a method for 
choosing. 
Memory has basic developmental characteristics and improves over time. 
These changes may be the result of improvements in the mechanics of the 
brain, the learning of memory strategies, and/or the development of 
metacognition. Metacognition, defined simply as knowing how thinking works 
(Siegler, 1991), is probably affecting children's performance in the memory 
task used in this experiment. This is not surprising as children have been 
shown not to have accurate impressions of their mind's capabilities (Kreutzer, 
Leonard, & Flavell, 1975). Their knowledge of the mind has yet to realize its 
inherent limitations, and so they either lack in knowledge or have incorrect 
assumptions about its abilities. The children in this study have probably not 
achieved the proper understanding of memory in order to participate 
successfully. In other words, the task was too hard for this age group. This 30 
level of difficulty was probably compounded by the fact that the line drawings 
were not colored, and were somewhat uninteresting in their simplistic drawing 
style. This may have generated a lack of interest in each picture, making 
recognition that much more difficult. 
The metacognitive strategy that children would need in this study 
involves the knowledge that only items that have been seen are those that 
can be remembered. Before using this understanding, though, children would 
first need to notice the difference between two pictures which varied only by 
the gender of the actor. As mentioned above, most children were capable of 
doing this. Next, they would need to choose one picture over the other. In 
order to accomplish this task children would need to know that you can only 
remember one item if originally presented with one item. Something that may 
have made this process even more arduous could have been the placement 
of the pictures. Even though the target pictures and their foils were present on 
the same memory cards, they were seldom neighboring each other. For some 
children, this could have made the practice of choosing one of two similar 
pictures even more difficult. 
This is not to say that the children were incapable of choosing one out of 
two similar pictures. With the experimenter's help, most of the remaining 
twenty-five children of the thirty-six which scored MA's of zero were able to do 
so. Through directed guidance and assistance, children are capable of 
achieving more than could have on their own. It is this assisting role that I 
would like to turn to next. 
The method in this study followed a very strict course in order to treat 
each child as similarly as possible. Normal human discourse, on the other 
hand, is very flexible. There are a variety of styles (Welch-Ross, 1997), and 
even where there are rules there is a process of interaction (Kleifgen, 1990). 
For this study, the lack of interplay made conversation seem strange and 31 
unnatural. It is believed that this rigid approach towards interaction was the 
most dehabilitating problem that was encountered. 
The studies that inspired the incorporation of children's verbalizations 
into this project (Price, 1984; Price, Hess, & Dickson, 1981) discussed 
children's responses to caregiver questions. At the time, there was a crucial 
element of these conversations that was missed. Caregiver's weren't simply 
asking a question occasionally. They were elemental in pushing children's 
cognitive level higher than the children could have accomplished on their 
own. They weren't asking, "What can you tell me about X." Instead, their 
questions were much more directed and probing. After one question was 
answered, the next would require more detail from the child. What was 
occurring was a learning process. 
This study, on the other hand, incorporated a different technique. It was 
much more like a job interview, with one repeated dead-end question. 
Children were put into a laboratory situation which had no real-world 
counterpart. In fact, only three children responded with the fantasy-filled 
gregariousness that had been originally expected. 
Further problems point to the non-verbal aspects of communication. 
Remember that the picture presentation at time 2 was as follows: Each picture 
was presented for five seconds and then removed from view. Children were 
asked a question about a picture, and then it was removed before they could 
complete their comment. To have left the pictures up longer for group three 
during their descriptions could have produced a confound for memory 
improvements. The picture removal, though, looks to have communicated a 
message to the subjects: All interaction about this picture is over. We are 
moving on. This resulted in their stoppage of speech, and their readiness for 
the next picture. This particular process limited children's chances to expound 
upon what they were seeing, a process thought to be essential in this study. 
Another possible difficulty deals with the process of inference in 
conversation. In group 2, children were only asked to describe inconsistent 33 
be chosen. By doing this, children have a variety of criterion upon which to 
judge the familiarity of novel pictures against those they have seen before. 
Younger children probably need this easier format in order to deliver valid 
memory scores. 
Second, the necessary metacognitive strategy for this task could be 
taught in an initial training phase prior to time 1. During this session, the 
researcher could attempt to teach the child first how to differentiate between 
two like pictures. Next, the child could be taught that when only one picture is 
initially presented, only one can be recalled. They would then have the 
necessary tools to be run through the experiment. Although this alternative 
appears more difficult, there was some evidence of marginal success with this 
technique and the children in this experiment. As stated before, the children 
who scored a MA of zero were given a similar, cursory training after the 
recognition phase (time 3). Out of those who could tell the difference between 
pictures, most children were capable of choosing one out of every two like 
pictures. 
In order for this study to take advantage of the memory benefits from 
conversation, there could be a move away from the quantitative methodology. 
This would result in a more flexible approach which tailors itself to the child's 
interests. Employing a style of discourse similar to that of a mother-child dyad 
(Welch-Ross, 1997) should yield a different outcome. Also, it makes sense 
that people will remember information better if they have encoded it in a 
meaningful context. There could still be some control, though. For example, 
during picture presentations, interactions could end after a specified time 
period. Also, there could be two groups. In one group, questions could be 
asked which only prompted children to talk more. In the other group children 
could be asked more probing questions which tied into children's previous 
responses. Alternately, children could be asked only one probe question. 
Minor changes could include: children could be asked a follow-up to the initial 
question asked in this study, "What are they going to do with the X?" Children 34 
could be asked a more descriptive question, "Can you make up a story about 
this man sawing wood? What is he making?" There could be a warm-up 
process prior to testing which encourages the child to speak and interact. 
Overall, the intent of these changes would be to tap into the process which 
makes new information personally meaningful, while creating a reliable copy 
of the environment. 
In order to test for the constraining effect of the label on children's 
responses, the label should be left out for group 3. When they are compared 
to group one (label only), children could be shown the picture and asked only, 
"What can you tell me about this picture." By doing so, children would be able 
to generate a personal impression of the stimulus material. 
The last change would be to exclude group 2 from the experiment until 
there was a reliable effect found between groups one and three. A 
confidence in the hypothesized outcome of the group one and three analysis 
led to the premature addition of group two. 35 
Conclusion 
Generalizations of this study to the population of preschool age children 
in Corvallis, OR, is suspect. This is primarily due to the non-normal 
distribution of the sample data. The main significance of this study, rather, lies 
in its investigation of the memory capacities of young children, and the 
importance of communication during memory acquisition. Indeed, this study is 
able to present greater insight and chart future directions more so in its failure 
than its success. If the results do represent a valid finding, though, then an 
important change is occurring. Gender is losing its salience as a categorical 
agent of memory. This has implications for self-perception as well as the way 
we comprehend others. The consequences, if true, should bring increased 
flexibility in people's chosen actions, but at the cost of the predictability of 
gender roles. 36 
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